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Abstract 
 
The Kyoto Protocol’s success or failure should be evaluated against the unobserved 
counterfactual of no treatment. This requires instrumental variables. We find that coun-
tries’ membership in the International Criminal Court (ICC) predicts Kyoto ratification 
in a panel model. Both multilateral policy initiatives triggered concerns about national 
sovereignty in many countries. We argue that ICC membership can be excluded from 
second-stage regressions explaining emissions and other outcomes. This is supported by 
first-stage diagnostics. Our results suggest that Kyoto had measurable beneficial effects 
on the average Kyoto country’s energy mix, fuel prices, energy use and emissions, but 
may have speeded up deindustrialization. 
 
JEL Code: C26, Q48, Q54. 







Ifo Institute for Economic Research 
at the University of Munich 
Poschingerstr. 5 





Ifo Institute for Economic Research 
at the University of Munich 
and University of Munich 
Poschingerstr. 5 










*We are grateful to Peter Egger, Mario Larch, Mary Lovely, Devashish Mitra, David Popp, and M. Scott 
Taylor for comments, and to the German Science Foundation (DFG) for financial support (grant no. 
583467). 
** Corresponding author. 2 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
1. Introduction
For many observers the Kyoto Protocol has been a failure. In 2011, many countries are still far
from achieving their promised carbon dioxide (CO2) emission reductions. This does, however,
not imply that the Kyoto Protocol has been completely futile. In order to evaluate the effect of
Kyotocommitmentsonenvironmentaloreconomicoutcomes,onewouldneedtocomparethe
status quo to the counterfactual situation of no climate deal. This counterfactual is, of course,
not observable. And selection of countries into the Protocol is most likely non-random. But
using instrumental variables (IV) to model the selection of countries into commitments un-
der Kyoto, it is possible to approximate the causal effect of Kyoto. This paper presents such
an instrument and uses it to evaluate the effect of Kyoto on countries’ emission levels, energy
variables, and macroeconomic outcomes.
The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to limit anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions. 37 industrialized nations and the European Union (EU) have agreed to cap their levels of
overall GHG emissions to an average of 94.8% of their 1990 emissions by the period 2008-12.1
In 2007, only four out of the 24 committed non-transition countries have emissions smaller
than their 2008-12 objectives. These countries are Germany, Great Britain, France, and Swe-
den. 12 out of the 14 transition countries will easily reach their targets.2 This is due to industrial
restructuring prior to signing the Protocol in 1997. After 1997, in seven transition countries,
emissions have been increasing again. In 2007, all committed countries together have emis-
sions standing at 98.1% of 1990 levels (3.3 percentage points above target), despite large reduc-
tions in transition countries.
The Kyoto agreement lacks a convincing formal enforcement mechanism. This may explain
whyachievedreductionshavesofarbeendisappointing. Yet,totheextentthatKyotohasestab-
lished a ﬂoor to the price of CO2 emissions, or has given rise to the expectation of such a ﬂoor,
it has added incentives to save on the use of fossil fuel. This is so for the EU Emissions Trading
System but holds more generally also for the ﬂexible mechanisms under Kyoto. Moreover, in-
formal enforcement – for example through naming and shaming – may still have an effect. The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (e.g. UNFCCC, 2009) summarizes
1The regulated GHGs are CO2, CH4, N2O, PFCs, HFCs and SF6.
2For instance, in 2007, the Ukraine has emitted only 47% of its target level. Countries with similar slack are Belarus,
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emission reduction achievements in annual reports. Non-achievers are criticized in the press
and by international organizations. For example UNDP (2007, p. 10) points out Canada as a
negative example of missing its target in a Human Development Report. And in a recent report
for the Canadian International Council, the authors argue: “[...] That said, the successful im-
plementation of the Copenhagen Accord is arguably more critical for Canada than for any other
country, offering a potential opportunity to shift the focus from Canada’s not meeting its Kyoto
obligations to an interpretation where Canada plays a role as a constructive contributor to the
new accord.” (Drexhage and Murphy, 2010, p. 4). The lack of formal sanctions has hampered
the Protocol, but it does not automatically imply that Kyoto has not added incentives to engage
in mitigation policies with the objective to save emissions.3
In this paper, we argue that countries’ membership in the International Criminal Court
(ICC), based in The Hague, Netherlands, correlates robustly to countries’ commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol. The Rome Statute, governing the ICC, was adopted in 1998 and ratiﬁed by
the necessary quorum of 60 countries by the end of 2002. The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated
one year earlier, and has been ratiﬁed by countries starting from 2001. The timing of the two
multilateral initiatives coincides nicely. The two treaties also posed similar domestic policy is-
sues. Forexample,commentatorssuchasGroves(2009)explaintheparallelsbetweentheKyoto
Protocol and the Rome Statute as threats to the sovereignty of the U.S., who has ratiﬁed neither.
Intermsofcontent,incontrast,thetwotreatieshavenothingincommon. ICCmembershiphas
nothing to do with environmental outcome variables such as the level of CO2 emissions; nor is
it likely to directly cause those variables.4 These features make ICC membership and its spatial
lag (i.e., other countries’ membership dummies, weighted by their distance and size) candidate
instruments for Kyoto commitment. However, to the extent that ICC membership proxies gen-
eral preferences for multilateralism, it is essential to account for the economic component by
controlling for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Our approach consists of two major steps. First, we use a panel of about 150 independent
countries to model the selection of countries into Kyoto commitments. While GDP per capita
3In a recent study, the IMF (2009) ﬁnds that voluntary or unenforceable ﬁscal rules have had signiﬁcant effects on
countries’ debt levels. Countries may have dramatically fallen short from proclaimed targets, but this does not imply
that the rules have not had any effect.
4Multilateral environmental agreements cannot be used as instrumental variables since they are likely to represent
‘green’ preferences and so directly inﬂuence environmental outcome variables. Other multilateral agreements such as
the Anti-Personnel Land Mines Convention also correlate to Kyoto status, but cannot predict the timing of ratiﬁcation.4 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
is a strong predictor, there is no automatic link: for example, rich countries such as the U.S.,
Singapore, South Korea, or Israel have chosen not to commit to an emission target. We ﬁnd that
ICC membership robustly correlates to ratiﬁcation of Kyoto commitments. Also, the spatial lag
of ICC membership makes Kyoto commitments more likely. Other exogenous variables such as
geographical remoteness reduce the likelihood of Kyoto commitment. These variables explain
about 50% of the variation in commitment.
In the second step, we use our instruments to estimate the effect of Kyoto commitment on a
host of environmental and economic outcome variables. Using a ﬁxed-effects panel approach
on yearlydata, or, alternatively, a longﬁxed-effects model onpre- and post-treatment averages,
we ﬁnd that, in the long-run, Kyoto commitment has indeed reduced CO2 emissions by about
10%, butstatisticalsigniﬁcanceoftheeffectismarginalinsomeoftheestimates. Kyotohasalso
led to restructuring of the energy mix: committed countries increase the share of alternative
energy sources, and shift away from fossil fuels. We ﬁnd that Kyoto commitment causes an
increase in the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel. We do not detect any robust and signiﬁcant
effect on GDP per capita, net exports, or energy imports. However, there is some evidence that
Kyoto commitment appears to accelerate deindustrialization: the share of manufacturing in
GDP falls by about 2 percentage points.
Related literature The environmental and public economics literature addresses the ques-
tion why countries form multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) and why some coun-
tries choose not to join (for examples, see Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998; Beron et al., 2003). The
focus lies on models of strategic interactions, coalition formation and free-riding. Beron et
al. (2003) empirically test for free-riding and spillover effects in the ratiﬁcation process of the
Montreal Protocol which regulates ozone depleting substances. In their interdependent Probit
modeltheyincludeGDPpercapita,initialemissions,developmentstatusandpoliticalfreedom
to explain ratiﬁcation. This list of explanatory variables is similar to ours.
CopelandandTaylor(2005)focusattentiontoimplicationsfrominternationaltrade. Intheir
theoretical model, an emission cap in an open Heckscher-Ohlin economy affects other coun-
tries’emissionsviafree-riding,incomeandterms-of-tradeeffects. Incontrasttopreviouswork,
the authors ﬁnd that, in the presence of trade, climate policy can also be a strategic comple-
ment instead of a strategic substitute. Note that, within their framework, membership in KyotoWHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 5
is assumed to be given. Egger et al. (2011) empirically test the relevance of international trade
relations as determinant for MEAs. Conversely, Rose and Spiegel (2009) argue that economic
outcomes are inﬂuenced by MEA memberships. A country’s memberships in MEAs signal its
discountrateandwillthereforebebeneﬁcialforfosteringinternationaleconomicrelations(i.e.,
the conclusion of free trade agreements). They use the Polity score from the Polity IV Project
as an instrument for MEA membership and ﬁnd a positive effect on FDI stocks and banking
claims.
The paper most strongly related to ours is probably Aakvik and Tjøtta (2011) who empiri-
cally estimate the effect of the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols on the reduction of sulfur dioxide
emissions. In contrast to us, they focus on emissions alone but do not ﬁnd statistically signif-
icant effects. This may be due to the fact that they do not instrument ratiﬁcation of the Proto-
cols. Also, the Kyoto Protocol goes farther than the other Protocols in setting savings incentives.
While carbon dioxide emission savings are equivalent to real cost savings for ﬁrms as they burn
less fuel, this is not true for sulfur emissions.
Finally, our paper is loosely related to the carbon Kuznets curve literature, for a survey see
Dinda (2004) or Galeotti et al. (2006). This literature estimates a dynamic relationship between
development (measured by GDP per capita) and CO2 emissions per capita. The purpose of
thosepapersistoestimatethe‘turningpoint’beyondwhichfurtherGDPpercapitagrowthlow-
ers emissions per capita. The mechanism is driven by structural change and non-homothetic
preferences. However, this is not the focus of our work. We are interested in the causal effect of
a speciﬁc policy (commitment to the Kyoto Protocol) on outcomes and not in explaining emis-
sions. More closely related to our work is a study by Grunewald and Martínez-Zarzoso (2009)
who include a dummy for Kyoto ratiﬁcation in the carbon Kuznets curve framework. In a panel
of 123 countries over the period 1974 to 2004, the authors ﬁnd that Kyoto obligations reduces
CO2 emissions. However, they treat Kyoto commitment as an exogenous variable so that their
results cannot necessarily be interpreted as causal.5
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2. econometrically analyzes the deter-
minants of a country’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, thereby describing the ﬁrst-stage
regression in our IV approach. Chapter 3. presents the second-stage IV results of the effect of
5It turns out that their results on emissions are not too different from ours, despite our use of IV methods. A major
difference, we look at a host of dependent variables rather than just on emissions.6 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
Kyoto commitment on several environmental and economic outcome variables. The last chap-
ter contains concluding remarks.
2. Who made commitments under Kyoto?
2.1. Measurement
The Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 and its ratiﬁcation process started in the early 2000s. It
is reasonable to assume that the Protocol starts to matter once ratiﬁcation through the parlia-
ment has occurred. Ratiﬁcation involves political parties, the media, and the general public,
while the signature of the Protocol directly following negotiation in 1997 had no immediate po-
litical relevance. The Protocol entered into force only in 2005 (after the ratiﬁcation of Russia),
but it is ratiﬁcation that sets the relevant domestic policy parameters. Hence, we deﬁne Ky-
oto commitment as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a country i has ratiﬁed the




> > > > <
> > > > :
0 no ratiﬁcation in t
1 ratiﬁcation and cap in t
: (1)
This deﬁnition does not attempt to measure the stringency of commitment but has the advan-
tage of simplicity. Uncertainty as to the exact timing of the Kyoto constraints inserts measure-
ment error into the Kyoto dummy variable and biases coefﬁcients towards zero.
2.2. Selection into Kyoto: descriptives
Common but differentiated responsibilities In our sample of 151 independent countries, 36
have commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.7 Arguing that rich developed countries are prin-
cipally responsible for the current levels of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere due to more
than 150 years of industrial activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations
under the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. However, in practice, this
does not at all mean that there is a direct link between per capita GDP and Kyoto status. Fig-
6We refer to these Annex B countries which have ratiﬁed Kyoto as ‘Kyoto countries’.
7One Kyoto country (Liechtenstein) is not included in our sample due to data availability.WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 7
ure 1 counts the number of 151 independent non-OPEC countries with commitments (ratiﬁed
by national parliaments) as of the year 2007 in different per capita income groups. Out of the
16 countries with real per capita income above the 90% percentile, 14 countries have commit-
ments (Singapore, and USA have none). Out of the 15 countries with per capita income above
the 80% percentile but below the 90% percentile, 8 countries have commitments (Bahamas,
Barbados, Cyprus, Israel, South Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, and Taiwan have none). Interest-
ingly, Cyprus and Malta, two EU member states, have no Kyoto commitments.
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Data source: Penn World Table 6.3, series rgdpch. Real GDP per capita in PPP-adjusted dollars.
Within the group of countries that had commitments as of 2007, there is some variation as
to the timing of national ratiﬁcation. The ﬁrst countries to ratify a commitment were Romania
and Czech Republic (in 2001), 27 countries ratiﬁed in 2002, Lithuania and Switzerland (2003),
Russia and Ukraine (2004), Belarus (2005) and ﬁnally Australia and Croatia (2007) followed.
Unconditional correlations These simple observations suggest that there is non-trivial het-
erogeneity across countries with respect to their Kyoto status. In this section, we draw on the
theoretical literature (in particular Copeland and Taylor, 2005; Beron et al., 2003) to explain the
observed variation. The analysis is deliberately exploratory. Ultimately, the aim is to identify
determinants of Kyoto commitments that are exogenous and not directly related to outcomes8 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
such as the level of CO2 emissions per capita.
The sample comprises a varying number of independent non-OPEC countries from 1997 to
2007.8 Table 1 reports summary statistics and data sources. In a ﬁrst step we look at countries
in the year of 2007 and explain their Kyoto status using their characteristics as of 2007 or lagged
versions thereof. Figure 2 plots beta coefﬁcients9 of these unconditional correlations for vari-
ous explanatory variables. Important determinants of Kyoto membership are, amongst others,
a country’s green preferences proxied by the number of ratiﬁed MEAs, EU membership, being
in the neighborhood of other (large) Kyoto countries (i.e. having a high value of the spatial Ky-
oto lag), lagged GDP per capita growth, and lagged emissions per capita growth. Note that the
laggedlogofemissionspercapitaispositivelycorrelatedwithKyotocommitment. Ataﬁrsttake
this seems implausible. But given that emissions are correlated with GDP , this unconditional
correlation partly picks up that Kyoto countries are economically large, industrialized nations
as well as that countries with low initial per-capita emissions, such as developing countries,
might expect emission increases in the future. Also, countries that have ratiﬁed other interna-
tional agreements such as the Rome Statute governing the International Criminal Court, the
Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention (APLC) or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty
(CTBT) are more likely to be Kyoto countries.
2.3. Selection into Kyoto: Regression analysis
Model The analysis in Figure 2 is suggestive. However, for the purpose of understanding the
effect of Kyoto commitment on economic and environmental outcome variables, one requires
anunderstandingoftheselectionprocessinapanelsetup. Therefore,weestimatethefollowing
linear probability ﬁxed-effects model10 for Kyoto commitments for the time span 1997-2007:




it + t + i + it; (2)
where Xit is a vector of controls which are likely to matter for Kyoto commitment and out-
comes alike and Zit is a vector of instruments that do not directly affect outcomes. To cap-
8We take all available countries into account.
9Beta coefﬁcients give the standard deviation change in the dependent variable per standard deviation increase in
the explanatory variable. The larger the beta coefﬁcient the greater is the effect of the explanatory variable.
10Note that there is no ﬁxed-effects estimator for the Probit model.WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 9
Figure 2: Simple correlations of Kyoto status and its determinants
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Note: The graph shows beta coefﬁcients (diamonds)  1.96 standard deviations (circles) of an OLS
regression of Kyoto status on the respective variable and a constant in a cross-section of 2007. The
constant is not reported. Varying sample sizes. * indicates variable is lagged 5 years.
ture cyclical elements (such as the oil price or the world business cycle) we include a full set of
year dummies t into all regressions. i is a full set of country dummies (ﬁxed effects) which
we eliminate through within-transformation of the data and it is the error term. We use a
heteroskedasticity-robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix and allow for clustering
at the country level in order to deal with serial correlation in error terms. The advantage of
using a panel ﬁxed-effects estimator is that one can make use of country and time variation si-
multaneously. Moreover, country-speciﬁc time-invariant determinants of Kyoto commitments
are fully controlled for.11
GDP per capita and carbon emissions Table 2 reports our main results on selection. Column
(1) uses GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, and the level of carbon emissions per capita to
explain Kyoto status. The effect of GDP per capita is non-monotonic. Doubling GDP per capita
(from the median level) increases the likelihood of Kyoto commitment by about 48 percentage
points.12 At the same time, higher CO2 emissions per capita reduce the odds. The ﬁrst ﬁnding
11We have also worked with a cross-section; results are comparable and available upon request.
12Median log GDP per capita is 8.75, so that the effect of doubling log GDP per capita is  3:54 + 2  0:23  8:75.10 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
relates to the common but differentiated responsibilities principle. It can also be rationalized
by mitigation policy being a superior good in voters’ utility functions. This is the case in the
model of Copeland and Taylor (2005). The second suggests that – for given income levels –
countries with high emissions per capita probably shy away from higher costs of bringing per
capitaemissionsdowntoaveragelevels. Thesetwovariables(togetherwiththetimetrendvari-
ables) explain almost 30% of total within variation. The two variables are, of course, potentially
endogenous to Kyoto status so that the obtained coefﬁcients cannot be interpreted as causal
effects.
Geographyandcountrysize Time-invariantgeographicalcontrolssuchasclimateorresource
endowment are accounted for by the within-transformation of the data. In contrast, geographi-
cal remoteness, calculated as the population weighted average geographical distance of a coun-
try to all the other countries, varies across time. More remote countries trade less and are
less integrated in the world economy. This measure is strongly negatively correlated to stan-
dard openness measures (exports plus imports over GDP). Column (2) shows that more remote
countries are less likely to have Kyoto commitments. Own population size also negatively af-
fects the odds, but is not signiﬁcant. Since we identify all effects in Table 2 by time variation
at the country-level, our results suggest that countries with higher own population growth or
higher population growth in nearby countries are less likely to have commitments.
Preferences Next, we include two variables to proxy for green preferences. The ﬁrst, the coun-
try’s chief executive party’s political orientation (taken from the World Bank’s Database of Polit-
ical Institutions 2010) takes the value of 0.1 if the executive is from the right, the value of 0.2 if
it is from the center, and the value of 0.3 if it is from the left. One would think that left-leaning
governments are more likely to accept commitments, but this does not show up in our regres-
sion. The second variable, the log stock of other (than Kyoto) MEAs is also expected to affect
the likelihood of commitment positively, but does not show up signiﬁcantly in the analysis.13
International Criminal Court membership Column (4) adds countries’ membership in the
International Criminal Court and the spatial lag thereof to the list of explanatory variables.
13These variables show up with the expected sign in the cross-section of countries.WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 11
ThesevariablesﬁllthevectorZit. TheICCdummytakesvalueofoneifacountryhasratiﬁedthe
Rome Statute governing the International Criminal Court and value zero otherwise. The spatial
lag of ICC membership is the ‘average’ ICC membership of other countries (all other coun-
tries’ membership dummies weighted by population over distance squared, and averaged).14
The coefﬁcient to this dummy suggests that countries having ratiﬁed the Rome Statute have
a 13 percentage points higher likelihood to have a commitment under Kyoto, given their de-
velopment status and current level of CO2 emissions per capita. An increase by one standard
deviationofthespatiallagofICCmembershipbooststheoddsofKyotocommitmentsbyabout
3.2 percentage points.15
WTO and EU Column (5) adds a dummy for membership in the WTO as another proxy for
trade openness and the country’s degree of multilateralism. That dummy does not feature
much variation over the time period; 13 countries have joined the WTO from 1997-2007; only
threeoutofthemalsohaveKyotocommitments(Croatia,Lithuania,Latvia).16 Itisthereforenot
surprising that WTO membership negatively correlates to Kyoto commitment. The EU dummy
has the opposite sign: ceteris paribus, joining the EU increases the odds of Kyoto membership
byabout19percentagepoints. ThisestimateisdrivenbytheEasternenlargementoftheUnion.
Note, however, that not all new EU members are Kyoto members as well (Cyprus and Malta are
not).
Industrial structure and energy mix Column (6) adds the share of renewable energy in total
energy production of a country. This variable is available only for a subsample of countries. It
is positively related to the propensity of Kyoto commitments, but the statistical precision of es-
timation is very low. Other indicators of the energy mix of countries fare similarly. Also, adding
theshareofmanufacturingintotalGDPhasanegativeeffect–asonemayexpect–buttheeffect
is not statistically signiﬁcant. Using time lags of these variables does not change the situation.
Preferred speciﬁcation Column (7) is our preferred speciﬁcation. It is similar to column (5)
but adds the spatial lag of Kyoto commitment. The more nearby countries have commitments,
14The exact calculation of the spatial lag does not make a signiﬁcant difference.
15Using the ICC variables without further controls yields comparable results.
16Other new members are former USSR states (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova), Asian countries such as China, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Nepal, as well as Jordan and Oman.12 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
the higher the likelihood that a country has a commitment, too. Since unilateral mitigation
policies contribute to a public good, other countries’ efforts may decrease own efforts. On the
other hand, other countries’ commitments lower negative competitiveness effects of own cli-
mate policies. The variable turns out to be positively associated to Kyoto status: when large
nearby countries commit to climate targets, commitment of a speciﬁc single country becomes
more likely. However, the effect is not overly large. With a mean of 0.13, the spatial lag adds on
average about 5 percentage points to the likelihood of Kyoto commitment. Column (7) is rather
successful in explaining the variation in Kyoto commitments, the within-R2 is almost 60%.
First-stageregression Speciﬁcation (7) is the nucleus of the ﬁrst-stage instrumental variables
regression that we employ in the next section. The regressions in Table 2 show that Kyoto and
ICC membership are highly correlated. This is probably due to the fact that both treaties pose a
threat to national sovereignty.17 So, the ICC status can be seen as a proxy for a country’s stance
on multilateralism. And indeed, prominent non-Kyoto countries such as China, USA, Israel,
Singapore or Thailand have not ratiﬁed the Rome Statute.
Moreover, the size of the country and its geographical position are likely to have direct im-
plications for outcome variables such as CO2 emissions per capita, their carbon taxes or their
share of manufacturing in GDP , but a country’s own and its neighbors’ membership to the Inter-
nationalCriminalCourt canbetakenasexogenousandexcludablefromregressionsthataimat
explaining emission outcomes. Countries do not sign up to the ICC because of their CO2 emis-
sions per capita, their carbon taxes or their share of manufacturing in GDP . Ratiﬁcation of the
Statute of the ICC does not directly affect outcome variables neither. We further argue that ICC
membership is uncorrelated with omitted variables in the outcome equation (e.g. technology
or development status), once we control for a country’s institutional environment e.g. through
the Polity index.
Hence, it appears that the two Rome Statute variables in speciﬁcation (7) (i.e., own ICC
membership and that of close countries) are good candidates for instrumental variables: they
canbeexcludedfromthesecond-stageregression, theydonotcausetheoutcome, areuncorre-
lated with the error term, and they correlate to Kyoto status.18 An F-test of joint signiﬁcance of
17For example, Groves (2009, p. 1) likens the Kyoto Protocol to the Rome Statute and argues that “[...] the proposed
“Kyoto II” successor agreement [...] poses a clear threat to American sovereignty. This threat is primarily due to the nature
of the proposed treaty – a complex, comprehensive, legally binding multilateral convention.”
18We have also experimented with other multilateral agreements such as the CTBT or the APLC. Ratiﬁcation of thoseWHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 13
the excluded variables yields a test statistic of 11.65 and a p-value of 0.00, thereby meeting the
rule of thumb by which an F-statistic larger than 10 (for a single endogenous regressor) avoids
the weak instrument problem (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
Robustness checks Columns (8) to (11) perform some robustness checks. So far, in the re-
gressions of this table we have excluded the OPEC countries from the sample. Column (8) adds
those 12 countries; point estimates and levels of statistical signiﬁcance do not change much.
Column (9) uses 5 year time lags of variables that are potentially endogenous to Kyoto com-
mitment: log GDP per capita and its square, and the log emissions per capita. Relative to the
benchmark regression of column (7), this affects the point estimate of the spatial lag of the ICC
variable, but has otherwise very little effect. Column (10) excludes all countries with income
below the median, none of which has a Kyoto commitment. With this smaller sample, we still
ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence of ICC membership. Not surprisingly, GDP per capita
ceases to be important. Column (11) excludes all countries with populations below 5 million.
This halves the sample size, but the ICC variables remain signiﬁcant. Finally, column (12) de-
ﬁnes the dependent variable differently: it codes as a zero a situation where a country has no
obligations under Kyoto, as 1 if the country has a slack cap, and as 2 if the country has a cap
that has been non-slack in the year of 1990. Relative to the benchmark regression, this model
with ‘Kyoto stringency’ as dependent variable has a slightly better R2, but otherwise fares very
similarly. Most importantly, the ICC variables continue to work.
3. The effects of Kyoto commitments on outcomes
3.1. Econometric issues
We are interested in understanding the effect of legally binding Kyoto commitments on a series
of outcome variables such as countries’ carbon emissions, energy mix, fuel prices, and macroe-
conomic variables. To this end, we estimate ﬁxed-effects models to control for unobserved
heterogeneity across countries, such as endowments with fossil fuels, patterns of comparative
advantage, or climatic and geographic conditions. We also include a full set of year dummies to
texts also tends to make Kyoto commitments more likely; however, the effects are weaker and less statistically signiﬁ-
cant.14 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
control for the world business cycle and the price of oil. The baseline estimating equation takes
the following form:
Yit = 0 + 1Kyotoit + 2X0
it + t + i + "it; (3)
where Yit is the outcome variable. i denotes a vector of country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects which we
eliminate by within-transformation of the data. t is a vector of year dummies and Xit is a vec-
torofcontrols. Inmostregressions, Xit containsthespatiallagofKyotocommitment, thelogof
GDP and its square, the log of population, economic openness, a country’s political orientation
measured by the chief executive’s party afﬁliation, dummy variables for WTO and EU mem-
bership, and the Polity index. In some regressions, we add the log of the nominal exchange
rate to the list of covariates. Whenever sensible, we use 5th time lags of GDP , openness and
the exchange rate to avoid spurious contemporaneous correlations. We adjust the variance-
covariance matrix for heteroskedasticity and for clustering of standard errors within countries
(for example, serial correlation).19 The latter adjustment strongly increases standard errors and
makes it much harder to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. Note that equation (3) is not
meant to investigate the importance of speciﬁc explanatory variables for special left-hand-side
variables. Rather, the focus lies on 1, the Kyoto coefﬁcient; the other included variables are
controls. Compared to Aakvik and Tjøtta (2011) study on sulphur emissions, we include more
controls but do not use linear and quadratic country-speciﬁc time trends.20
One complication that arises when estimating equation (3) is that ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates could be biased for several reasons: (i) reverse causality and closely related
selection into treatment, (ii) omitted variables and (iii) measurement error. First, countries
that are on a negative emission trajectory due to prior investments in green technology or sec-
toral restructuring toward services might be more willing to self-select into Kyoto. This reverse
causality results in a bias of the OLS estimate. Second, preferences for environmental qual-
ity, expected damage from global warming or expected negative competitiveness effects may
vary differently across countries over time, thus creating omitted variables bias. Depending on
the correlation of the omitted variable with Kyoto status, the resulting bias could be positive or
19Stock and Watson (2008) recommend that, if serial correlation is suspected, correcting for clustering is essential to
ensure consistency of the estimated variance-covariance matrix.
20Their data set has a much longer time dimension (T = 43) and a much smaller cross-sectional dimension (N =
30). In our work, with T = 11 and N = 150, including these trends is very costly in terms of degrees of freedom.
Including region-speciﬁc time trends leaves our main results unchanged.WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 15
negative. Third, ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol is only a proxy for a country’s climate pol-
icy activities. The resulting measurement error will bias the estimates toward zero. With these
considerations in mind, we do not know a priori the direction of the bias in OLS estimates. In-
strumenting for Kyoto status can cure these biases. In chapter 2. we argued that membership
to the International Criminal Court and its spatial lag correlate with Kyoto commitments and
are likely to be exogenous to the variables of interest such as emissions, energy consumption,
fuel prices or macroeconomic outcomes. In the following we use these instruments in an array
of regressions.
In the following we study the effect of Kyoto commitment on different outcome variables in
twosteps. Foreachareaofinterest,westartwiththesimplestpossibledifferences-in-differences
(diff-in-diff) setup, where the period average 1997-2000 is compared to the average for 2004-07
(with ratiﬁcation of Kyoto between these intervals) for the group of Kyoto and non-Kyoto coun-
tries. We make the results visible in simple pictures. In the second step, we show ﬁxed-effects
regressions of (3) based on yearly data and apply our instrumentation strategy.
3.2. CO2 emissions
Theevidenceinadiagram WestartwithinvestigatingtheroleofKyotocommitmentsforCO2
emissions in the simplest possible unconditional diff-in-diff framework.21 The left-most dia-
gram in Figure 3 shows the change in the log of emissions over two groups of countries: coun-
tries who end up with emission caps, and countries who do not. The changes are computed
over period averages 1997-2000 (before the ﬁrst country has ratiﬁed the Protocol) and 2004-07
(following the ratiﬁcation of Russia and Ukraine in 2004). Ratiﬁcation occurred later only in Be-
larus (2005), Australia and Croatia (2007). Between the two periods, emissions have increased
on average by 23.8% in the group of non-committed countries while they have increased on
average by 4.3% in the group of committed countries. In both groups, there is substantial vari-
ation. Emissions fell substantially in some developing countries affected by civil war (such as
Afghanistan or Burundi), and increased strongly in countries recovering from crises (such as
Chad or Angola). In the group of committed countries, Luxembourg, Norway, and Spain have
increased emissions by more than 20%, while they fell slightly in Belgium or Germany. Ob-
21CO2 emissions data is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2010 and comprises emissions
stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced
during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas ﬂaring.16 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
servations cluster strongly around the means (marked by the end points of the line). Fitting a
linearregressionlnEMit = const:+Kyotoit+it intothecloudrevealsacoefﬁcientof-0.19,
statistically different from zero at the one percent level of signiﬁcance.22
The middle diagram in Figure 3 repeats this exercise for log emissions per capita while the
right-most diagram looks at log emissions per unit of GDP (emission intensity). Both scatter
plots hint toward a downward-sloping relationship between emissions and Kyoto status. Inter-
estingly, adjustment for population change does not majorly change the ranking of countries in
bothgroups. Emissionintensityhas beenfallinginmost committedcountries, most stronglyin
formerly communist transition countries. Note, however, that this is driven not by falling emis-
sions but by fast rising levels of GDP . In 1997, the year at which we start the analysis, most of
the emission-saving industrial restructuring away from old carbon-intensive technologies and
heavy industries toward cleaner technologies and services had already happened.
OLS regression results Table 3 presents more complete econometric results. It runs versions
ofequation(3)togeneralizetheanalysisofFigure3. Theregressionsdifferfromtheﬁgurebyus-
ingyearlydataandwithin-transformingthedataratherthanﬁrst-differencingit.23 Columns(1)
and (2) present OLS estimates. They differ with respect to the time span covered: column (1)
spans 1990-2007 while column (2) covers our preferred window 1997-2007 (symmetric around
mostcountries’ratiﬁcationdate). Column(1)showsthat,holdingpopulation(andtime-invariant
country characteristics) ﬁxed, emissions are positively correlated to log GDP but negatively to
its square. Evaluated at the mean of log GDP , the elasticity of emissions with respect to GDP
is 0.63. The elasticity remains positive for all observed GDP levels. The elasticity of emissions
with respect to population is statistically indistinguishable from unity. Turning to column (2),
which draws on a shorter time series, squared GDP is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. Also the
population elasticity is somewhat smaller, while still statistically identical to unity (p-value of
the Chi2-test is 0.31). These ﬁndings square well with the literature.24
Interestingly, Kyoto status correlates negatively to log emissions in both columns. The effect
is somewhat more pronounced in the longer panel than in the shorter: Kyoto commitment is
22The result may be driven by outliers. Using robust regression techniques that downweight outliers yield negative
signiﬁcant results (applying the usual tuning weight of 7), too, but the estimated coefﬁcients are typically smaller. The
same holds also true for the analyses in Figures 4 to 6.
23Results on long ﬁrst-differences are presented in Section 3.6..
24See, e.g., Dinda (2004) and Cole and Neumayer (2004).WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 17












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































coef.: -0.153, s.e.: 0.030; N=174.
Log emissions per GDP
Note: The diagrams show the change between pre- (1997-2000) and post-treatment (2004-07) aver-
ages for non-Kyoto (0) and Kyoto countries (1).
associated to a reduction of emissions by 9.26 and 6.08%, respectively. In the longer panel, the
spatiallagofKyotocommitmentisinsigniﬁcant,whileinthelongerpanel,thereisevidencethat
neighboring countries’ Kyoto commitment actually drives up own emissions. Yet, the effect is
small: evaluated at the mean, foreign commitment drives up emissions by 0.63%.25 This is, of
course, an average, and may hide substantial cross-country heterogeneity.
The OLS regressions in columns (1) and (2) also suggest that green preferences – proxied by
the log of the stock of other MEAs – affect emissions negatively. Again, somewhat unexpectedly,
the political orientation of the chief government executive matters for emissions: right-wing
governments have 3.5% lower emissions than left-wing governments.26 EU membership corre-
lates negatively to emissions: in the short panel (column (2)), EU countries’ emissions are on
average 5% lower. Trade openness, as proxied by the sum of exports plus imports over GDP and
25100  0:0234  0:270:
26 0:002  17:33: This surprising ﬁnding is not driven by correlation between the political and the business cycle,
since we control for GDP . It is more likely driven by policy implementation lags.18 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
the WTO dummy does not appear to affect emissions.27 The degree of democracy of a country,
as captured by the Polity measure, does not directly matter, neither.
IV regression results To get the treatment effect of Kyoto commitment, we instrument for the
Kyoto dummy with the ICC membership dummy and its spatial lag. Column (3) of Table 3 re-
portstheresultsforthe1997-2007panel. Kyotoappearstoreduceemissionsby11%onaverage.
This is slightly more than the OLS estimates have suggested. Hence, measurement error over-
compensates simultaneity bias. This is probably not surprising, given the fact that our Kyoto
dummy is only a very imprecise proxy for countries’ true emission mitigation policies. Com-
pared to the OLS estimates in column (2), the coefﬁcients on the other covariates are not very
different and the pattern of statistical signiﬁcance is the same. Column (4) repeats column (3)
but drops insigniﬁcant covariates. The point estimate of the Kyoto dummy barely changes.
Since GDP may be endogenous to Kyoto commitment if costly climate policy reduces GDP per
capita, reverse causation would bias our results. Since the coefﬁcient on log GDP in column (4)
is statistically identical to unity (p-value of the Chi2 test is 0.51), one can subtract log GDP from
theright- andleft-hand-sidesso thatlog GDPdisappearsfrom thelist ofcovariatesin theequa-
tion. Column(5)doesthisandﬁndsaKyotoeffectofagain-10%, albeitwithsomewhatreduced
statistical signiﬁcance (p-value 0.09).
For the IV regressions (3) to (5), the ﬁrst-stage diagnostics signal instrument validity. Tests
for overidentifying restrictions yield p-values of the Hansen j-statistic between 0.19 and 0.36.
Those tests do not reject the null that the instruments are exogenous. The F-statistics for weak
identiﬁcation range between 17.15 and 19.90, well above the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of
thumb of 10. According to Stock and Yogo (2005), the implied true size of the F-test is 10%,
so that we do not face a weak instrument problem. In the face of weak instruments, those
authors recommend the use of limited information maximum likelihood (LIML). In the context
of speciﬁcations (3) to (5), LIML does not change the point estimates of the Kyoto effect, but
improves the power of the weak identiﬁcation test.
Robustness checks Columns (6) to (12) perform robustness checks. Columns (6) to (8) use
Kyoto stringency28 instead of the Kyoto dummy as the dependent variable. The IV strategy con-
27Using the log of remoteness instead of openness yields comparable results.
28Kyoto stringency is deﬁned in subsection 2.3. and used in column (12) of Table 2.WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 19
tinues to work ﬁne with weak identiﬁcation tests yielding F-statistics on excluded instruments
well above 20, and the overidentiﬁcation restrictions are satisﬁed. Since stringency has support
over the interval [0,2], it is not surprising that the point estimates are smaller than the ones for
the commitment dummy. The stringency measure is statistically signiﬁcant and negative. The
point estimate in column (8) suggests that countries with a slack cap (as of 1990) have 5% lower
emissions, while countries with a non-slack cap have 10% lower emissions.
Columns (9) to (12) repeat regression (3) for different subsamples. Column (9) excludes the
10 OPEC countries included in column (3). The IV strategy continues to work, and the point
estimate on the Kyoto dummy is almost exactly identical to the one found in column (3). Col-
umn (10) uses only countries with GDP per capita levels higher than the median (as of 2007).
Major emerging economies such as China, Brazil, Russia and South Africa remain in the sam-
ple,butIndiaorIndonesiadropout. Withthismuchsmallersample,theF-statisticonexcluded
instruments is 8.38 which signals a potential weak instrument problem. The results suggest
that Kyoto reduces emissions in this sample by about 9%. Using LIML estimation to avoid the
weak instrument problem yields very similar point estimates of the Kyoto dummy. Column (11)
eliminates transition countries from the sample. Interestingly, this reduction of the sample un-
does the statistical signiﬁcance of the Kyoto dummy, but the magnitude of the effect remains
comparable to earlier results. However, dropping insigniﬁcant covariates restores the statistical
signiﬁcance of the Kyoto effect, albeit at a point estimate that appears implausibly large.
Summarizing OLS estimates of the effect of Kyoto on CO2 emissions do not appear to be bi-
ased away from zero. Using ICC membership dummies as instruments, our IV regressions sug-
gest that, compared to the counterfactual, Kyoto commitment reduces carbon emissions by
about 10%. While the IV strategy generally works very well, in most regressions, the Kyoto effect
is statistically signiﬁcant only at the 5 or 10% level. Doubts about a measurable Kyoto effect are




The evidence in a diagram We start with the effect of Kyoto commitments on countries’ en-
ergy mix. The left-most diagram in Figure 4 plots changes in the share of fossil fuels in total
energy consumption. That share has increased substantially in some countries such as Viet-
nam or China (by 15.5 and 6.6 percentage points, respectively), but has fallen in crisis-stricken
countries such as Zimbabwe. In the group of committed countries, the share of fossil fuel has
fallen in countries such as Denmark, Iceland, or the Czech Republic, but for different reasons.
While the former two countries expanded the share of wind and hydro power, the latter in-
creased the share of nuclear energy. The importance of fossil fuel has increased by a surprising
amount in Luxembourg, but also gained ground in Norway (from a very low level). On average,
committed countries reduced the share of fossil fuels by almost exactly one percentage point,
while it increased by about 1.5 percentage points in the sample of non-committed countries.
The difference of 2.49 percentage points is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The next
diagram shows changes in the share of renewables in total energy consumption. Within the
group of committed countries, that share increased most in Denmark (by about 5 percentage
points), but fell slightly in Norway. It increased by 1.05 percentage points on average in com-
mitted countries. Cross-country variation in the sample of non-committed countries is large,
but clusters around -2 percentage points. The difference between the group averages is 2.99,
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. It appears, thus, that changes in the share of renewables
in total energy use correlates positively with Kyoto commitment.
The third diagram refers to the share of coal in electricity production, while the right-most
diagram studies the share of new clean forms of energy (wind and solar). On average, the share
of coal has decreased slightly in the group of committed countries (-1.28 percentage points),
while it has minimally increased in the sample of non-committed countries (+0.55 percentage
points). The difference is 1.83 percentage points and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
(p-value 0.03). Interestingly, there are a couple of non-committed countries, where wind and
solar energy expanded substantially (Kenya, Nicaragua, San Salvador), but in the sample of
non-committed countries as a whole, the share increased by 0.33 percentage points only. In
the sample of committed countries, Iceland, and Germany as well as Spain and Portugal have
considerablyincreasedtheirsharesofnewcleanenergysources. Thegroupaverageis1.77. TheWHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 21
growth difference between the two groups is 1.45 percentage points, signiﬁcant at the 5% level
(p-value 0.02).
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coef.:  1.45, s.e.:  0.59; N=132.
New clean (##)
Note: The diagrams show the change between pre- (1997-2000) and post-treatment (2004-07) aver-
ages for non-Kyoto (0) and Kyoto countries (1). New clean refers to wind and solar energy. #: share in
total energy consumption. ##: share in electricity production.
Regressionresults Table4followsTable3andprovidesregressionresultsonyearlydataofthe
effect of Kyoto commitment. To save space, Table 4 only reports the Kyoto estimates and ﬁrst-
and second-stage diagnostics. Full results are delegated to the web appendix but discussed in
the text. Columns (A1) to (A3) investigate the effect of Kyoto on the share of renewables in total
energy use. The uninstrumented effect implies that Kyoto commitment increases that share by
1.45 percentage points, while the spatial lag of Kyoto is negative. Instrumentation doubles the
effect of Kyoto on the share of renewables, and excluding transition countries from the sam-
ple increases it further. Columns (A4) to (A6) investigate the effect of Kyoto on the share of22 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
fossil fuel in total energy consumption. The ﬁrst column presents a non-instrumented regres-
sion. The EU membership dummy appears to negatively correlate with the share of fossil fuels,
while log population and the spatial lag of Kyoto commitment is positively associated, the lat-
ter signaling a possible free-rider effect. Own Kyoto commitment bears a negative sign, but the
coefﬁcient fails to be statistically signiﬁcant (p-value 0.16). Overall, it is not very easy to explain
changes in the share of fossil fuel, probably due to a lack of time-variance in the dependent
and the independent variables and to the fact that the Kyoto dummy is an imprecise proxy for
climate policies. Using IV estimation remedies the latter problem. Column (A5) shows that ICC
membership and the lag thereof continue to be good instruments: both, the overidentiﬁcation
and the weak instrument tests suggest instrument validity. The resulting point estimate is neg-
ative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. It implies that Kyoto commitment results in a
2.67percentagepointsreductionintheshareoffossilfuelintotalenergyconsumption. Exclud-
ing transition countries (column (A6)) does not change this ﬁnding. Similarly, using the Kyoto
stringency variable has no substantial effect on results either (not shown).
Columns(B1)to(B3)analyzetheshareofcoalintheproductionofelectricity. Whiletheanal-
ysis in Figure 4 suggests a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship, controlling for a host of
variables such as the log of population or an EU dummy, and applying our IV strategy, there is
no statistical evidence in favor of a negative effect of Kyoto on the share of coal. This is despite
the fact that our instruments continue to do ﬁne. Finally, columns (B4) to (B6) study the share
of new clean energy sources (such as wind and solar power) in the electricity production. Both,
the uninstrumented and the IV regressions suggest that Kyoto commitments have increased
that share by almost 2 percentage points. In line with other results in this paper, we ﬁnd that
measurement error in the Kyoto variable dwarfs the possible bias from reverse causation. In-
terestingly, the IV estimates do not show that more democratic countries (higher Polity index)
have seen larger increases in the share of new clean energies, nor is the EU dummy signiﬁcant.
There is also no evidence for free-riding, as other countries’ commitment has no effect on the
share of new clean energies.WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 23
3.4. Fuel prices and energy and electricity use
The evidence in a diagram We continue with the effect of Kyoto on fuel prices. The two left-
most panels of Figure 5 plot the (absolute) changes in fuel prices, expressed in U.S. dollars per
liter, across the groups of committed and non-committed countries.29 Overall inﬂation in the
price of oil leads to rising prices in both groups. Since the price of oil, the key input in pro-
duction of diesel fuel or gasoline, is quoted in U.S. dollars on world markets, and fuels are very
strongly traded internationally, it is reasonable to assume the law of one price to hold. Devi-
ations due to country-speciﬁc factors such as reﬁnery capacity, distribution systems, or geo-
graphical situation are taken care of by time-differencing. We interpret the data in the ﬁgures
as deviations from the world price caused by fuel subsidies or taxes. The ﬁgures do not, how-
ever, inform about the price of those fuels relative to other goods. The price of diesel fuel has
increased by about 30 cents in the group of non-committed countries and by 49 cents in the
group of committed countries. The differential increase across the two groups is 19 cents. It
is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. A similar picture emerges when looking at gasoline. The average
increase in non-committed countries was 28 cents and in committed countries 46. The differ-
ence, 18 cents, is again statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
InthenextstepweinvestigatetheroleofKyotocommitmentforthepercapitauseofenergy
and electricity. The unconditional diff-in-diff exercise is visualized in the two panels on the
right in Figure 5. The log of energy use per capita (in kg of oil equivalent) has increased in most
countries; most notably in China where it has increased by almost 45 percent. It has fallen in
some industrialized countries such as New Zealand, Great Britain or Germany. In the group
of non-committed countries the average rate of change is 9%, while it is 6% in the sample of
committed countries. The difference, about 3 percentage points, is only marginally statistically
signiﬁcant (p-value 0.10). Turning to the log electricity per capita (in kWh) consumption in the
right-most diagram, cross-country variation in growth rates is wider than for energy use per
capita. Electricity use per capita has grown by 83 and 72% in Vietnam and China, respectively.
The average growth rate of the two observed periods is 24% in the sample of non-committed
countries and 12% in the group of committed countries. The difference, 12%, is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.30
29In our more comprehensive regression analysis we include the exchange rate as a control.
30Robust estimation lowers the point estimate to 9%, still signiﬁcant at the 1% level.24 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































coef.: −0.12, s.e.: 0.03; N=132.
Log electricity
use p.c.
Note: The diagrams show the change between pre- (1997-2000) and post-treatment (2004-07) aver-
ages for non-Kyoto (0) and Kyoto countries (1).
Regression results Panels (C) and (D) in Table 4 present regression results based on yearly
data. Column (C1) reports the uninstrumented ﬁxed-effects estimator. It suggests that Kyoto
status is positively associated to the price of diesel fuel. Also the spatial lag of Kyoto commit-
ment correlates positively. Contrary to what one may conclude from the theoretical literature,
the price of fuel increases with GDP , but that relationship is non-monotonic.31 Left-leaning
chief executives of governments are associated to lower fuel prices, but this effect stops to
be statistically signiﬁcant when Latin American countries are dropped from the sample (not
shown). WTO and EU dummies lead to higher diesel prices (by 5 and 16 cents, respectively).
Higherdegreesofdemocracydonotinﬂuencefuelpricessigniﬁcantly. Withanadjusted(within)
R2 of70%, thespeciﬁcationissurprisinglysuccessfulinpredictingthedieselprice. Instrument-
31Using GDP per capita in the regression instead of GDP leads to exactly the same result.WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 25
ing Kyoto commitment leaves the controls virtually unchanged, but the Kyoto effect more than
doubles to 18 cents per liter. The IV strategy turns out to work reasonably well: the weak identi-
ﬁcation test yields an F-statistic of 18.12, and the overidentiﬁcation test does not reject instru-
ment validity. Excluding transition countries (column (C3)) does not change the picture. The
same is true when Kyoto stringency is used instead of the Kyoto dummy (not shown). The re-
sults for the price of gasoline (columns (C4) to (C6)) look very similar. Again, the instrumented
estimation yields a point estimate of Kyoto that is about double the uninstrumented one.
We now turn to the effect of Kyoto on the log energy use per capita. The uninstrumented
regression yields a negative, statistically signiﬁcant effect of -5%. Population growth exerts a
strongnegativeeffectwhiletradeopennesshasaweakpositiveone. HigherGDPleadstohigher
energy use per capita, but only through the squared term. The spatial lag of the Kyoto variable
is negative but not signiﬁcant. Turning to IV estimations, the negative effect of Kyoto remains
but is no longer statistically signiﬁcant at standard levels (e.g., the p-value in column (D2) is
0.12). Interestingly, the evidence is different for electricity consumption per capita. Kyoto com-
mitment decreases consumption by 5% without instrumentation and by about 9% with instru-
mentation. Comparison with the lack of effects on energy consumption suggests that Kyoto
commitment may have caused a substitution away from electricity to other forms of energy
(e.g., in heating systems). Also interesting, and reminiscent of the results for emissions, exclud-
ing the transition countries from the sample lowers statistical signiﬁcance (p-value 0.05).
Summarizing we ﬁnd evidence that Kyoto led to some restructuring toward cleaner energy
sources such as wind and hydro power. Also, fuel prices went up and there is some evidence of
lesselectricityusepercapita. ThismightexplainpartoftheemissionreductionsinKyotocoun-
tries. In the last step, we now investigate the effect of Kyoto commitment on macroeconomic
variables such as per capita income, the share of manufacturing in total output, and the trade
balance.
3.5. Macroeconomic outcomes and international trade
The evidence in a diagram The left-most panel in Figure 6 plots the change in the share of
manufacturing. On average, in the sample of non-committed countries that share fell very
slightly by -0.32 percentage points between the two periods. In most countries, it remained26 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
fairly constant (China, Indonesia, India), whereas it increased substantially in some (Argentina,
Brazil). Idiosyncracies play an important role, see the outlier of Albania or Suriname. In the
sample of committed countries, the manufacturing share fell on average by -1.73 percentage
points. It fell most in Ireland, where the share shrank from 33 to 25 percent, but increased
in Romania from 20 to 25. The difference between sample averages is equal to -1.43, statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1% level.32 The next diagram plots changes in the log of GDP per capita.
Non-Kyoto countries had, on average, a growth rate of 32% between the two periods. Some
countries experienced a dramatic decline in GDP per capita (e.g. the crisis-stricken Zimbabwe
-24%) whereas other countries had a boom (e.g. China with a growth rate of 74%). In the group
of countries with Kyoto commitment, the average growth rate between the two periods was
42%. Most striking is that the countries with above average growth rates are mostly economies
in transition (such as Belarus, Estonia or Ukraine). The difference between the group averages,
10 percentage points, is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.33
Finally, the last two diagrams in Figure 6 turn to net exports over GDP and net energy im-
ports relative to energy use. On average, net exports fell by 1.2 and 2.0 percentage points, re-
spectively,inthegroupofnon-committedandcommittedcountries. Thedifferenceis-0.78and
not statistically signiﬁcant. In the sample of non-committed countries, the change in the en-
ergy import share is, on average, almost identical to zero. The difference across the two groups
ofcountriesisstatisticallynotdifferentfromzero,either. Changesinnetenergyimportsarepo-
tentially explained by economic growth, substitution away from traditional domestically avail-
able fossil fuel sources (coal) towards imported ones (gas), and increases in domestic oil pro-
duction. Given the importance of idiosyncratic factors, it is not surprising that the ﬁgure does
not reveal a discernable pattern across Kyoto and non-Kyoto countries.34
Regression results Table 4, Panel (E) and (F) report results of ﬁxed-effects regressions based
on yearly data. We apply the standard model (3), but use 5th lags of potentially endogenous
variablessuchasthelogofGDP ,thelogofthenominalexchangerateandopenness.35 Columns
(E1) to (E3) analyze the effect of Kyoto on the share of manufacturing in GDP . The results con-
32Using robust regression to penalize outliers, the difference is -1.13, still signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
33Using robust regression techniques does not change the result.
34The ﬁnding does not change when only energy importers are considered. Robust regression techniques show that
the ﬁnding of no relationship is not due to outliers.
35Generally, results do not depend on taking these lags. They are also insensitive to using the real exchange rate
instead of the nominal one or of using some measure of geographical remoteness instead of openness.WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 27
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coef: −0.11, s.e.: 0.10; N=132.
Net energy
imports (#)
Note: The diagrams show the change between pre- (1997-2000) and post-treatment (2004-07) aver-
ages for non-Kyoto (0) and Kyoto countries (1). Sample excludes OPEC and other major oil producing
countries. # Net energy imports as share of energy consumption.
ﬁrm the ones obtained in Figure 6: Kyoto commitment reduces the manufacturing share by
about0.82percentagepointsinthenon-instrumentedcaseandbyabout1.22percentagepoints
in the IV regression. Excluding transition countries makes the effect stronger (-1.9 percentage
points) and enables more accurate estimation (p-value 0.03). Columns (E4) to (E6) look at real
GDP per capita. Log population is negatively related to real GDP while WTO membership ap-
pearstoenterpositively. ThePolityindexisinsigniﬁcant. Moreimportantly,Kyotocommitment
does not appear to have any measurable impact on GDP per capita, neither in the OLS nor in
the IV regressions.36 For all regressions the IV strategy works well.
Columns (F1) to (F3) regress net exports over GDP (the trade balance) on the Kyoto dummy
36These regressions are not to be interpreted as growth regressions. With the fairly short time period under analysis
(1997-2007), time variation in most independent variables is fairly low. This is particularly so for variables that turn
out signiﬁcant in standard growth regressions such as Polity IV or measures of human capital. The latter is captured by
country effects.28 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
andcontrols. LogGDP(the5thtimelagthereof)correlatespositivelywithnetexports,thenom-
inal exchange rate does not appear to matter. The Kyoto effect is negative, but statistically in-
signiﬁcant. Finally, turning to the share of net energy imports in countries’ total energy use, we
add the log nominal exchange rate with the U.S. dollar as an additional independent variable to
theregressionmodel. Theuninstrumentedregressionincolumn(F4)showsthata10%increase
in GDP appears to reduce energy imports as a share of total energy use by about 10 percentage
points. An increase in the size of the population by 10% is associated to a 17 percentage points
increase in the share of energy imports. This implies that higher per capita income is nega-
tivelyassociatedtotheshareofenergyimported, butthateconomicsize(population)increases
that share. WTO membership appears to increase the share of imports by about 15 percentage
points while a depreciation of the national currency relative to the dollar (higher nominal ex-
change rate) makes imports more expensive and lowers their share in total energy use. While
thesearereasonableresults, Kyotomembership, instrumentedornot, hasnomeasurableeffect
on energy imports. The argument that climate policies may reduce countries’ dependence on
imported fossil fuels is not supported by the data.37
Summarizing, we ﬁnd some evidence that Kyoto led to deindustrialization of committed
countries,possiblybyrelocatingindustrialproductiontonon-committedcountries. Thateffect
lies between 1 and 2 percentage points and is therefore not economically negligible. We do not
ﬁnd, however, that this is associated with lower GDP per capita or lower net exports. The point
estimates are negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant.
3.6. Robustness: long diff-in-diff estimation.
Bertrandetal.(2004)arguethatstandarderrorsoftreatmenteffectsindiff-in-diffestimationare
inconsistentandtheestimator’sstandarddeviationisunderestimatediftheoutcomeandtreat-
ment variable are both serially correlated over time. This might lead to an overrejection of the
null of no effect. In our case, this condition is most likely met. Once the Kyoto dummy switches
to one it stays on and the treatment variable changes little over time. The same is true for most
outcome variables. The authors suggest a long diff-in-diff estimator to cure the problem, i.e.
apply a ﬁxed-effects estimator to the pre- and post-treatment averages. There has been some
37This ﬁnding is robust to restricting the sample to net energy importers (the Kyoto coefﬁcient turns negative but
remains insigniﬁcant). It is also robust to applying 5th time lags to the potentially endogenous variables log GDP , log
nominal exchange rate, and openness.WHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 29
heterogeneity in the timing of Kyoto’s ratiﬁcation across countries, but most countries have rat-
iﬁed between 2001 and 2003. Therefore, we deﬁne the pre-treatment period to be 1997 to 2000
and the post-treatment period to be 2004 to 2007.38 Subsequently, we apply the long diff-in-diff
estimator as a further robustness check. This is analogous to the graphical analysis in chapters
3.2. to 3.5., but takes into account the possible endogeneity of Kyoto commitment.
Table 5 shows the results. Each column corresponds to the IV regression of one outcome
variable on Kyoto status in the base sample and sample without transition countries, respec-
tively. Instruments for a country’s Kyoto status are again the ICC dummy and its spatial lag.
Controls are included as in Tables 3-4. The EU dummy is not included since between the
two periods it only changes for new accession countries and is therefore effectively a transi-
tion country dummy. Again, our instrumentation strategy works well. The over-identiﬁcation
test does not reject39 and the test on excluded instruments rejects weak instruments. The IV
estimates of Kyoto’s effect from the long diff-in-diff model square well with the once found in
the ﬁxed-effects model on yearly data both in terms of the estimates’ sign and signiﬁcance. The
only exceptions are log emissions per GDP where we no longer ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient, the manufacturing share where we only ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect in the subsample of
non-transition countries and energy use per capita and the net energy import share where the
coefﬁcients turn out to be signiﬁcant now. Overall, the point estimates are somewhat larger in
absolute terms for some of the long diff-in-diff estimates.
Summarizingtheﬁxed-effectsandlongdiff-in-diffresults,thereissomeevidencethatKyoto
countries reduced overall CO2 emissions by roughly 10% relative to non-Kyoto countries. Kyoto
commitment had a pronounced effect on diesel and gasoline prices, and led to restructuring of
the energy and electricity production. Interestingly, there has been a substantial increase in the
share of renewables and new energy sources (such as wind, solar or hydro power). In terms of
macroeconomic outcomes, we ﬁnd some evidence for a decline in the share of manufacturing
in Kyoto countries of roughly 2 percentage points. However, our results suggest that Kyoto has
not affected real GDP per capita.
38Note that Russia and Ukraine have ratiﬁed Kyoto in 2004 and Belarus in 2005 but are treated as Kyoto country.
Australia and Croatia have ratiﬁed in 2007 and are assigned to the control group.
39Onlyforthedieselprice,theover-identiﬁcationtestisweaklyrejectedatap-valueof0.10and0.09,seecolumns(13)
and (14).30 AICHELE, FELBERMAYR
4. Conclusion
The success or failure of the Kyoto Protocol in curbing GHG emissions is mostly judged against
the text of the agreement. It is very likely that many countries will not reach their promised
emission targets in the 2008-12 period. And additionally, for most countries that will meet their
target, this emission ceiling was slack in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, Kyoto is deemed pointless.
Yet, we argue that this accounting exercise cannot inform about the causal effect of Kyoto com-
mitment. Instead, to ﬁnd the treatment effect of Kyoto one should assess outcomes such as
emissions against their unobserved counterfactual. But Kyoto membership is likely not ran-
dom. This complicates ﬁnding the counterfactual due to reverse causality. Therefore, we use
an IV strategy. We propose to use a country’s preferences for multilateralism, i.e. its commit-
ment toaims ofthe internationalcommunity, as instrumentfor Kyoto. Ratiﬁcation ofthe Rome
Statute that constitutes the International Criminal Court and its spatial lag serves us as a proxy.
We argue that these instruments are valid because they are strongly correlated to Kyoto status
and will very likely fulﬁll the exclusion restriction.
Wethenuseourinstrumentsinapanelof150countriesovertheyears1997-2007toestimate
Kyoto’s average treatment effect. We ﬁnd evidence in ﬁxed-effects and long diff-in-diff models
that Kyoto reduced the average Kyoto country’s CO2 emissions by about 10%. This result is sur-
prising, given the generalized belief that the Kyoto Protocol is ineffective and given the negative
ﬁndings of Aakvik and Tjøtta (2011) on the Helsinki and the Oslo Protocols. Yet, we believe that
our ﬁnding is not implausible. Unlike other environmental pollutants, CO2 emission is costly
due to the price of fuels, energy and electricity. Kyoto commitment adds incentives to save on
fuel and energy use. The observed difference in emission growth rates between Kyoto and non-
Kyoto countries could be the result of climate policy efforts in Kyoto countries and informal
enforcement mechanisms (naming and shaming). And we indeed ﬁnd, that Kyoto commit-
ment increases fuel prices and leads to favorable changes in the energy mix. But part of the
observed difference could also be a result of carbon leakage due to relocation of industries. The
sign of the spatial Kyoto lag hints at this possibility. Taken together, those effects can explain
the seizable treatment effect on emissions. Moreover, we ﬁnd that Kyoto led to a certain degree
of deindustrialization but had no causal effect on GDP per capita growth.
A key novelty of our paper is the application of the ICC ratiﬁcation dummy as instrumentWHAT A DIFFERENCE KYOTO MADE 31
for Kyoto commitment. It might prove useful in other contexts as well. For example, it could
be used to estimate Kyoto’s effect on bilateral trade ﬂows for energy-intensive sectors and thus
help underpin the debate about carbon-related border tax adjustments.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Source
Kyoto dummy (0,1) 1,547 0.12 0.32 www.unfccc.int
Spatial lag, Kyoto dummy 1,547 0.12 0.37 own construction
Kyoto stringency (0,1,2) 1,547 0.19 0.55 own construction
ICC membership dummy 1,547 0.33 0.47 www.icc‐cpi.int
Spatial lag, ICC dummy 1,547 0.27 0.94 own construction
log CO2 emissions (metric tons) 1,547 9.81 2.26 World Bank, WDI 2010
log CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (kg per 2000 US$ GDP) 1,547 ‐8.14 0.83 own construction
log CO2 emissions per capita (metric tons) 1,547 0.52 1.67 own construction
Pump price of diesel fuel (USD/l) 659 0.56 0.34 World Bank, WDI 2010
Pump price of gasoline (USD/l) 659 0.71 0.35 World Bank, WDI 2010
Share of renewables in total energy production 1,282 21.66 27.39 World Bank, WDI 2010
Share of coal in total electricity production 1,282 17.79 27.06 World Bank, WDI 2010
Share of fossil fuels in total electricity production 1,282 69.22 27.02 World Bank, WDI 2010
Share of alternative sources in total electricity production 1,282 2.37 5.00 own construction
log net energy imports (% of energy use) 872 ‐0.98 0.86 World Bank, WDI 2010
log electricity use per capita (in kWh) 1,271 7.30 1.52 World Bank, WDI 2010
log energy use per capita (in kg oil equivalent) 1,282 7.20 1.01 World Bank, WDI 2010
log real GDP per capita 1,547 8.65 1.15 PWT 6.3 (rgdpch)
Share of manufacturing in GDP 1,380 15.54 7.57 World Bank, WDI 2010
Net exports per unit of GDP 1,368 ‐1.15 7.34 World Bank, WDI 2010
log GDP 1,547 17.94 1.88 PWT 6.3 (cgdp)
log GDP squared 1,547 325.54 68.65 own construction
Openness, current price 1,547 0.85 0.47 PWT 6.3 (openc)
log remoteness 1,547 ‐0.61 0.95 own construction
log nominal exchange rate to the US dollar 1,547 3.19 2.81 World Bank, WDI 2010
Polity IV index (‐10: perfectly aucratic regime, 10: full democracy) 1,547 3.60 6.37 www.systemicpeace.org
log population 1,547 9.29 1.50 World Bank, WDI 2010
log stock of multilateral environmental agreements 1,547 3.27 0.58 iea.uoregon.edu
Chief executive party orientation (right: 1, center: 2, left: 3) 1,547 1.25 1.27 Word Bank, DPI 2010 (execrlc)
WTO dummy 1,547 0.81 0.39 www.wto.org
EU dummy 1,547 0.12 0.32 europa.eu
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